What Happened to Russia's Wagner?
How the African Corps took over Wagner’s operations in Africa
This article is an expanded and thoroughly updated edition of a piece I originally published in International Dispatches in February 2024. While much of the material concerning the formation of the African Corps has been retained, this version offers fresh insights and a much broader context, providing readers with a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the subject.
Despite the Wagner mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Russian state shows no intention of abandoning the private military business model he pioneered in Africa, a model that proved highly effective in securing resources and extending Moscow’s influence. The Kremlin has now assumed control of this approach, rebranding it as the African Corps. This new entity has not only continued Wagner’s previous operations in Mali, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR), but has also established fresh footholds in Burkina Faso and Niger.
Following Prigozhin’s death, the Wagner Group’s military assets were formally dismantled and divided among various branches of the Russian state, chiefly the Ministry of Defence and Rosgvardia. Military operations were initially placed directly under the authority of Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. Nevertheless, certain economically focused divisions of the business within Russia were entrusted to Pavel Prigozhin, the late Yevgeny’s son, presumably to foster a sense of continuity and to persuade those still loyal to Prigozhin to sign new contracts under the revised structure overseen by the Ministry of Defence. Meanwhile, the Wagner Group’s media assets, including the notorious Internet Research Agency, were largely disbanded and distributed among Russian oligarchs, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), with the propaganda apparatus falling under the control of Artem Kureyev, an officer in the FSB Fifth Service’s “Department for Operational Information and International Relations.”
The absorption of the Wagner Group into official state structures presented Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the activities of Prigozhin’s affiliates, aligning them more closely with state objectives and ensuring a unified Russian front in Africa. The first indications of a restructured Wagner emerged as early as July 2023, during the annual Russia-Africa summit in Saint Petersburg. At this event, then Defence Minister General Sergei Shoigu reportedly urged African leaders to terminate their contracts with Wagner and instead enter agreements with companies controlled by the Russian defence ministry. The decision to establish the African Corps was taken immediately after the summit.
By the end of September 2023, General Yevkurov, overseeing military operations, visited several African countries, including Mali, Libya, Algeria, the Central African Republic (CAR), Niger, and Burkina Faso, to negotiate the terms of renewed Russian security assistance, consisting primarily of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency support. He was accompanied by General Andrei Averyanov, commander of the GRU’s notorious Special Action Service (Centre 161), responsible for Unit 29155 (linked to sabotage in Czechia and Bulgaria, as well as the Salisbury poisoning) and Unit 54654, known for cultivating networks of illegals (intelligence operatives without military or diplomatic cover). These two figures are widely regarded as the architects of the African Corps and are believed to retain significant influence over its military operations to this day, despite subsequent command restructurings, which I intend to discuss later in the article.
The new designation, “Afrikanskiy Korpus” (African Corps), first appeared on 21 November 2023 in an article published by African Initiative, the Kremlin’s premier propaganda outlet on the continent. The publication proclaimed its mission to support African states in “resisting the neo-colonial influence of the West,” to secure a “resource base,” and to strengthen the African-Russian “partnership of equals,” while also promoting arms exports, humanitarian aid, and infrastructure projects, including pandemic response initiatives. These themes are consistent with longstanding Russian, and even Soviet, messaging in Africa, which has traditionally sought to undermine the enduring Western influence. The name “African Corps” likely resonates with Wagner’s original “Slavic Corps,” but, much like Wagner itself, also evokes Nazi associations with Hitler’s expeditionary force in Africa.
Initially, the Corps was tasked with dramatically expanding Russia’s presence in Africa, with recruitment drives aiming for a force of 20,000 troops. Unsurprisingly, this target proved unattainable. Despite a large recruitment push, the African Corps’ numbers on the continent are estimated to remain at around 5,000 to 7,000, comparable to Wagner’s previous deployments. Recruitment, announced via Telegram, has focused primarily on “military personnel with combat experience who have participated in the SMO (Special Military Operation— read the war in Ukraine)” as well as former and current Wagner employees. According to African Corps’ public statements, it is led by officers from elite Russian Armed Forces and private military units with extensive combat experience, including in Ukraine. It is likely that roughly half of its personnel, and a number of officers, are former Wagner members, with such backgrounds being preferred. However, those currently serving in Ukraine were prohibited from joining the African Corps, unsurprising, given that Ukraine remains Russia’s primary military focus.
Expanding the Russian Footprint in Africa
Has anything changed under the new administration? While the core operations of the African Corps remain much as they were, the most significant shift under the new administration is a clear pivot towards political objectives, rather than just financial gain. The Corps has broadened its reach, expanding into regions and countries now deemed strategically important for Moscow’s foreign policy. Similarly, it has withdrawn from areas where continued involvement could jeopardise Russian interests, even if those operations were profitable. As a result, activities in the CAR have to some extent lost their former prominence, and Russia’s engagement in the Sudanese conflict is no longer dictated by financial motives.
Meanwhile, the African Corps has sought to entrench itself further in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Libya, and Moscow has been an outspoken supporter of the newly formed “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) in the Francophone Sahel. Many of these political ventures may exist largely on paper for now, but they represent incremental victories for Russia as it manoeuvres to fill the security vacuum left by France, the United States, and other European powers being pushed out of the region. In essence, much like its Wagner predecessor, the African Corps is expected to exploit the growing rift between Western states and illiberal African governments. Despite the loss of plausible deniability, private military companies remain a cornerstone of Russia’s Africa policy.
Interestingly, despite the Russian defence ministry’s efforts to erase all traces of Wagner branding, the name still carries considerable weight in some of the group’s oldest and longest-running African operations. In the CAR, for instance, pro-Russian propaganda continues to feature locals wearing Wagner-branded shirts and merchandise, demonstrating the group’s enduring popularity following its role in repelling the rebel offensive on Bangui in early 2021. On the ground, African Corps operations in the CAR are still led by many of the same commanders as before the Wagner mutiny, with only minor reshuffles among junior officers. The mission itself remains unchanged. Russia continues to operate an armed, industrial-scale gold mining model, while steadily expanding into other sectors of the local economy.
Additionally, Yevkurov’s 2023 diplomatic tour brought tangible results in terms of African Corps expansion. Burkina Faso became the first country to formalise an agreement with the Corps following direct talks with Russia. Initially, President Ibrahim Traoré was reluctant to admit foreign militias, despite widespread pro-Russian sentiment in the capital. He instead sought to enhance his own forces by recruiting a volunteer-based paramilitary auxiliary. However, the effectiveness of this strategy was thrown into doubt after an attempted coup in 2023. In the aftermath, the first twenty Russian instructors from the RSB Group arrived to assist in countering jihadi extremists from the local Ansarol Islam group, paving the way for a larger contingent of Russian mercenaries who arrived in January 2024.
That notwithstanding, Libya was always intended as the principal theatre for African Corps expansion. Yet, in the wake of the Wagner mutiny, Russia’s position there was left in disarray. Shifting political calculations in Moscow, wavering support for Khalifa Haftar, and a series of tactical setbacks rendered the situation precarious. Nevertheless, Russia ultimately achieved its core objective and in exchange for defence systems and military training, it secured a permanent naval base in Tobruk. Today, an estimated 2,000 Russian mercenaries are stationed in eastern Libya, and the country serves as a crucial logistical hub for wider African Corps operations. With Assad now ousted from Syria, maintaining a foothold in Libya (and in the Mediterranean) has become even more vital, and further engagement by the African Corps seems all but inevitable. There are already signs that Russia is transferring military equipment from Syria to Libya, though whether this is a temporary measure or a long-term strategy remains to be seen.
State of Play as of July 2025
In June 2025, the last independent remnants of the Wagner Group announced their departure from Mali, signalling a new phase of Russian involvement as the Ministry of Defence seeks to consolidate its African activities under the African Corps banner. Despite the claims of their mission being accomplished, the Malian junta has continued to lose ground since Wagner’s arrival in late 2021. The African Corps is now expected to step in with a larger footprint, aiming to take up the fight against both non-jihadist Tuareg separatists in the north and the increasingly serious al Qaeda- and IS-linked insurgencies. These jihadist factions have grown increasingly stronger, and Wagner previously suffered significant losses to Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM). The African Corps has already confirmed its intention to remain in Mali, though the transition has been complicated by the shifting loyalties of former Wagner mercenaries.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to deepen its presence in the CAR, with Deputy Defence Minister Yevkurov making another high-profile regional tour in March 2025. In CAR, ex-Wagner operatives still hold the most influential ties to President Touadéra and maintain control over lucrative Russian interests in timber and gold, despite Moscow’s attempts to centralise authority. This dynamic could cause friction, as Wagner veterans have built substantial personal relationships with local elites in both CAR and Mali. The ongoing goodwill of these governments towards Russia may well depend on the continued involvement of these familiar faces.
Additionally, Russia is seeking to establish itself in Chad, normalising relations with President Déby and attempting to supplant France and the United States after their departure in late 2024. However, Moscow’s more direct involvement in African Corps operations strips away the ambiguity that Wagner once provided. Moscow can no longer distance itself from its African activities, making it more vulnerable to domestic and international backlash. Wagner’s ambiguous legal status as a private military company, illegal under Russian law, previously allowed the state to obscure contractor casualties and shift blame when operations faltered, as seen in the deadly Tinzaouten ambush in Mali and the failed Mozambique deployment. Now, with African Corps personnel entitled to state benefits, Russia will be forced to acknowledge losses more openly, a prospect deeply unpopular at home. Russian families are increasingly questioning the purpose of these distant conflicts, and African governments are likely to leverage their influence over Russia’s international image, playing Moscow off against other global powers as needed.
These new realities are likely to draw Russia further into protracted conflicts, since retreating could damage its reputation as a reliable security partner. Wagner was able to withdraw abruptly from unprofitable ventures, but the African Corps cannot afford such flexibility. With jihadist forces on the rise, missions in the Sahel and CAR are likely to become even more unpopular domestically and a growing drain on resources, especially as the Kremlin remains heavily committed in Ukraine. This could make Russian forces more casualty-averse, potentially leading them to avoid high-risk counter-insurgency missions and making Russia a less attractive partner for African governments, who may begin to seek alternative security arrangements.
Amid these challenges, Moscow appears to be reconsidering its approach to African Corps leadership. In June 2025, reports emerged that billionaire Gennady Timchenko may be taking the control, following the GRU’s failure to meet Kremlin deadlines for the Corps’ development. Timchenko, alongside Mirzayants of the Redut PMC, is said to have capitalised on recruitment shortfalls and operational setbacks to supplant the GRU’s oversight. Notably, African Corps recruitment surged in early 2025, lending some credibility to these claims. Regardless of who holds operational control, the Ministry of Defence retains administrative authority, ensuring Russia’s commitment to its African ventures. This evolving leadership structure may restore some of the flexibility and personality-driven decision-making reminiscent of the Wagner era, keeping Russian engagement adaptable and opportunistic.
Russia’s increasingly open engagement in Africa, with all its advantages and drawbacks, has opened a window of opportunity for European states to reset their relationships with African nations and to offer credible alternatives to Moscow’s security assistance. While the legacy of colonialism continues to complicate Western engagement, the United States still holds the potential to reshape the West’s approach, especially as many African states have signalled a willingness to forge robust partnerships with Washington.
Importantly, several EU member states, unburdened by a colonial past and equipped with advanced arms industries, are well placed to support African leaders who share a commitment to values aligned with the West. However, the absence of a coherent EU grand strategy, combined with a migration policy that is perceived as highly militarised, remains a significant barrier to building trust and fostering meaningful cooperation with potential African partners.
Ultimately, the challenge for both the EU and the US will be to bridge the trust deficit and address the diverse needs of African countries, which is proving to be an increasingly complex task given the West’s competing priorities in Ukraine and Pacific. Whether Europe and America can seize this opportunity to offer a compelling, values-driven alternative to Russia’s model remains an open question, but the stakes for influence and partnership on the continent have never been higher.
Great work! Not a fan of Shawn Ryan but enjoyed this interview: https://youtu.be/6AlOvA_vJO8?si=T2hqoGMC7Fo6HhCf
Let me know what you think if you listen.